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Torts and Workmen's Compensation
TORTS
Wex S. Malone*
Only a few decisions involving relatively important matters
of general interest to the profession were handed down by the
Supreme Court during the past term. There was, of course, the
usual quota of controversies in which findings of fact were re-
viewed.1
NEIGHBORING LANDOWNERS - DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES
In numerous decisions during recent years courts throughout
America have been imposing absolute liability on persons who
brought onto their property highly dangerous substances which,
upon escaping, inflicted injury on neighboring landowners. In-
cluded in such activities are fumigation with noxious gases and
the dusting of crops with poisons. 2 Recovery is usually based
upon the doctrine first announced in the English decision, Ry-
lands v. Fletcher, and which has been adopted in about twenty
American jurisdictions. The gist of the Rylands v. Fletcher doc-
trine is that a person who engages in an "ultra-hazardous" ac-
tivity is liable for resulting damage to the property of another
although the utmost care was exercised to prevent the harm."
The doctrine has the support of the Restatement of Torts."
An activity is said to be "ultra-hazardous" if it "necessarily
involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of
others which cannot be eliminated by the utmost care, and is
not a matter of common usage."5 The ultra-hazardous activity
doctrine has been applied to the use of dynamite and other ex-
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 231 La. 859, 93 So.2d 194 (1957) (inter-
section collision) ; Leonard v. Holmes & Barnes, Ltd., 232 La. 229, 94' So.2d 241
(1957) (collision with overtaking vehicle) ; Washington Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 232 La. 379, 94 So.2d 295 (1957) (defendant failed to es-
tablish contributory negligence).
2. Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949);
Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal.2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
3. 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 14.3 (1956) ; PRosemi THE LAW
or TORTS § 59 (2d ed. 1955).
4. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1938).
5. Ibid.
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plosives, 6 to gas,7 and the blowing out of oil wells,8 as well as to
the spreading of dangerous fumes or substances as suggested
above. It has frequently been pointed outs that even jurisdic-
tions which purport to deny the application of the ultra-hazard-
ous activity doctrine do in fact reach the same conclusion by
denominating the activity as a "nuisance" or by purporting to
discover negligence through the use of "res ipsa loquitur."'10
From the standpoint of judicial administration a desirable
feature of the ultra-hazardous doctrine is its plasticity. Most
modern industrial activities involve an appreciable element of
danger, but this is not enough to justify their being classified
as "ultra-hazardous." In the absence of a statute, for example,
the escape of fire or sparks from the boiler of a factory or a
locomotive does not result in liability unless negligence or fault
on the part of the operator can be shown.1 Furthermore, an
activity which is a matter of common usage in the community
usually escapes the category of ultra-hazardousness.
As indicated above, injuries to a neighbor's crops through
the use of poisonous dust distributed by airplane have generally
given rise to liability under the Rylands v. Fletcher doctrine,
without reference to the fault or negligence of the person en-
gaged in the operation. This same conclusion - that the defend-
ant should be liable - was reached by the Louisiana Supreme
Court during the past term in Gotreaux v. Gary.12 The decision
of the Louisiana court, however, did not rely upon the principle
of ultra-hazardous activity. Instead, it rested on Article 667 of
the Louisiana Civil Code:
6. Exner v. Sherman Power Const. Co., 54 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1931).
7. Northwestern Utilities, Ltd. v. London Guarantee and Accident Co., [19361
A.C. 108 (P.C.). It is noteworthy that with reference to gas the application of
the doctrine may be rejected when small quantities of gas are piped onto the
premises for domestic use. Miller v. Robert Addle & Sons Collieries, Sess. Cas.
150 (Scotland 1934).
8. Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928).
9. Proesser, The Pritcple of RVlands v. Fletcher, in PROSSER, SELECTED Topics
ON THE LAW OF TomTS 135, 159-77 (1954).
10. A particularly interesting example in Louisiana is Watkins v. Gulf Refin-
ing Co., 206 La. 942, 20 So.2d 273 (1944). The court shelved the application of
Rylanda v. Fletcher as an academic question and proceeded to hold defendant for
its "negligence" by applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, although evidence
suggesting "fault" was practically non-existent. The writer has discussed this case
in The Work of the Loui#tana Supreme Court for the 1944-1945 Term - Torts,
6 LOUISIANA LAW Ravmw 601 (1946).
11. Excellent discussion and collection of Louisiana cases in Comment, 15
LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 163 (1954).
12. 232 La. 373, 94 So.2d 293 (1957).
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"Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he
pleases, still he can not make any work on it, which may de-
prive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or
which may be the cause of any damage to him."
The conclusion that the crop duster in this case should be
liable to his neighbor without reference to any fault or negli-
gence is indisputably sound. This writer, however, has serious
misgivings concerning the appropriateness of the rule or maxim
selected by the court to support its conclusion. The same argu-
ment - that one person should arbitrarily be made liable when-
ever he so uses his land as to injure his neighbor - had been
used the previous year in Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Com-
pany.18 Defendants in that case had used explosives for geo-
physical observation and in so doing had inflicted concussion
and vibration damage on the plaintiffs. Here again, the court
properly imposed absolute liability. Only a handful of American
jurisdictions would deny recovery under such facts, irrespective
of an absence of negligence; and the case falls properly under
the Rylands v. Fletcher doctrine.14 But the court observed, un-
fortunately as I see it, that the action was not one in tort; that
recovery rested on a rule of property law- Article 667 of the
Civil Code.
The proposition that a proprietor cannot use his property in
such a way as to injure his neighbor, irrespective of how careful
he may be, is simply too broad for general usage. The court's
13. 227 La. 866, 80 So.2d 845 (1955). See Professor Campbell's excellent dis-
cussion of this case in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1954-
1955 Torm -Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 16 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
267 (1956).
14. It is interesting to note that strict liability was imposed from earliest
times upon the blaster who cast rocks or debris upon his neighbor's property. The
suit was regarded as one in trespass and the fault element was ignored. Hay v.
Cohoes Co., 2 N.Y. 159 (1849). However, many courts refused to impose a similar
strict liability for concussion damage. It was felt that "care" not "trespass" was
the proper form of action, and in "actions on the care" a showing of fault had tra-
ditionally been required. Cases distinguishing between concussion damage and the
casting of roeks and other substances are now, fortunately, comparatively few.
PiO6seRm THE LAW oF TORTS 56, § 13 (1955). RESTATEMENT, TORTS 5 158, Com-
ment (h) (1938) ; Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L.
REv. 359 (1951).
It is of particular interest that in the first Louisiana case to consider concus-
sion damage by blasting the court of appeal denied liability and dismissed Civil
Code Article 667 by observing that the plaintiff's property was removed a con-
siderable distance from the site of defendant's operations, and that they were
therefore not "neighbors." McIlhenny v. Roxana Petroleum Corp., 122 So. 165
(La. App. 1929). In an earlier decision of the Supreme Court, Egan v. Hotel
Grunewald 0o., 129 La. 163, 55 So. 750 (1911), defendant was held liable for
damage to adjaeent property inflicted through pile driving. Negligence was clearly
indicated. The court relied indiscriminately both on Article 667 and Article 2315.
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unguarded announcement is certain to rise to plague it in later
controversies. For example, we observed earlier that railroads
have consistently been exonerated from liability for fire caused
by sparks that escaped from locomotives, provided that every
reasonable precaution was used. 15 Yet clearly in such instances
the railroad has innocently used its land so as to damage its
neighbor. The same would be true of the spread of fire from a
well-operated industrial plant or the accidental escape of im-
pounded water from a properly constructed swimming pool.16
It seems inescapable that as cases arise the court will be
obliged to sort out the types of damaging activities for which
non-fault liability will be imposed from those for which it will
not be so imposed. Article 667 provides no such leeway.
The substance of Article 667, "Sic utere tuo ut alienam non
laedas," has been pressed upon common law courts as a reason
for imposing absolute liability for many years. Occasionally, it
is received with favor in controversies where the activity was
of an ultra-hazardous character, and it has sometimes been re-
garded as synonymous with the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher.1 7
Where, however, the activity that resulted in damage was not of
an ultra-hazardous character or where it was one in common
usage in the community, the courts have put the sic utere doc-
trine aside with the observation that it is clear that a person
must not enjoy his property in a negligent manner so as to in.
jure his neighbor (i.e., he must not be guilty of fault). 1 As so
interpreted, the sic utere rule is not an announcement of any
new principle. In truth, more flexibility is needed in the cases
involving neighboring owners than can be afforded by Article
667 or its common law counterpart. 19
15. Comment, 15 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 163 (1954).
16. Clearly to be distinguished is the situation where the proprietor of a pool
intentionally releases the water or diverts it onto his neighbor's property. This is
a clear deliberate invasion of his neighbor's land, and is actionable. See Adams v.
Town of Ruston, 194 La. 403, 193 So. 688 (1940) (damages allowed, although
injunction denied).
17. See, e.g., Green v. General Petroleum Co., 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952
(1928) (oil well blow out) ; Kall v. Carruthers, 59 Cal. App. 555, 211 Pac. 43
(1922) (escape of large quantities of impounded water with knowledge of de-
fendant).
18. See, e.g., Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 173 Atl. 627
(1934) (escape of polluted water from refinery in industrial community). See also
Erle, J., in Bonomi v. Backhouse, El. B. & E. 622, 120 Eng. Rep. 643 (Q.B.
1858): "The maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, is mere verbiage. A
party may damage the property of another where the law permits;'7and he may
not where the law prohibits: so that the maxim can never be applied till the law
is ascertained; and, when it is, the maxim is superfluous."
19. In Jeansonne v. Cox, 96 So.2d 557 (La. 1957), the court denied the ap-
plication of Article 667 to the construction of a drainage canal In the absence of
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Although this reviewer does not doubt that our court with
characteristic ingenuity can manage to manipulate this broad
platitude so as to avoid injustice, yet I suggest that it can avoid
much entanglement by a forthright adoption of the ultra-hazard-
ous activity doctrine in its stead. It is also noteworthy that the
contractor operating the airplane in Gotreaux v. Gary was held
liable under the sic utere maxim, although he was not a pro-
prietor of land; nor was Gotreaux his "neighbor." Yet the con-
tractor was engaged in an ultra-hazardous activity, and, of
course, he was properly held. Distortion of the sic utere maxim,
however, was essential even to reach this conclusion.
INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT
There is considerable difference of opinion concerning the
extent of protection, if any, that should be afforded a contract-
ing party against interference by a third person with his con-
tract rights. The interference may take the form of an inten-
tional procurement of a breach of the contract. In most juris-
dictions, both in this country and abroad, such deliberate induce-
ment of a breach of contract is an actionable tort.20 Only in
Louisiana 21 and, possibly Kentucky, 22 is interference of this kind
permitted. Where, however, the third person is not motivated
by a desire to bring about a breach of contract, or where he acts
without knowledge of the existence of the contract, recovery is
generally denied everywhere. Similarly, when the conduct of the
third person consists merely in some negligent act which in-
creases the burden of the plaintiff's contract or which in some
way lessens the benefit of the agreement to the plaintiff, recov-
ery is universally denied.23 This same conclusion was reached
recently by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Forcum James Co.
v. Duke Transportation Company.24 In that case plaintiff, a pub-
any evidence of a physical invasion of the property or a nuisance. Similarly, it
was held in Modica v. Employer's Casualty Co., 231 La. 1065, 93 So.2d 659
(1957), that irrespective of the theory of recovery, plaintiff must show that some
conduct or activity on the part of the defendant was the cause of his neighbor's
damage.
20. The doctrine that liability exists for the nonprivileged intentional inter-
ference with contracts was first announced in Lumly v. Gye, 2 Ell. & Bl. 216, 118
Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853). The doctrine has since been adopted, developed, and
enlarged in this country and in England. Harper, Interference with Contract Rela.
tions, 47 N.W.U.L. Rzv. 873 (1953); Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36
HAav. L. REv. 663 (1923) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 766 (1938).
21. Cust v. Item Co., 200 La. 515, 8 So.2d 361 (1942).
22. Chambers v. Probst, 145 Ky. 381, 140 S.W. 572 (1911).
23. Bee the excellent discussion in PROSsE, THE LAW oF TORTs 732 (1955).
24. 231 La. 953, 93 So.2d 228 (1957).
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lic road construction firm, was under a contract to repair and
maintain a temporary bridge owned by the State of Louisiana.
It claimed that the bridge was damaged through the negligence
of defendant trucking company, thus putting plaintiff to the ex-
pense of repairing the structure. In denying recovery for the
defendant's alleged misconduct, the court relied largely on the
leading authority of the United States Supreme Court in Rob-
bins Dry Dock and Repair Co. v. Flint.25
NEGLIGENCE - ASSURED CLEAR DISTANCE RULE
In earlier installments of this survey of the torts decisions
of the Supreme Court it has been noted that the arbitrary duty
to stop within the range of vision has been so substantially re-
laxed in recent decisions that the duty could now be appropriate-
ly described as one merely obliging the driver to maintain such
control and speed as will enable him to bring his car to a reason-
able stop if faced with a sudden obstruction in his path of
travel."
The reviewer has ventured the opinion that the reasons for
this relaxation of the older rule are fairly clear.27 The situations
have involved rear-end collisions. Nearly always the claim has
been against the owner or operator of a vehicle that has unrea-
sonably obstructed the open highway by being parked on the
thoroughfare without lights or other warning. The typical de-
fense in this kind of suit is that the vehicle approaching from
the rear should have been in a position to come to a complete
stop arbitrarily and that failure to drive within the range of
vision was contributory negligence barring recovery. Should
this contention universally prevail, the open highway obstructor
(who affords one of the greatest perils experienced in modern
traffic) would escape liability almost automatically by casting
upon the rest of the traveling public the unqualified duty of
avoiding his obstruction. In order to avoid such an indefensible
result, the courts have whittled away at the arbitrary duty to
stop within the range of vision, bringing about a much more
equitable (although concededly more uncertain) state of affairs.
When, however, the controversy is not one between the ob-
25. 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
26. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for tho 1955-1956 Term-
Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 17 LOUISIANA LAW RzvIEW 345, 346-47(1957).
27. Ibid.
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structor and the operator of the following vehicle the problem
assumes a different aspect. It may happen that the driver who
finds the way ahead suddenly obstructed will seek to avoid a
rear-end collision by turning into the opposite lane of traffic
where he collides with a carefully driven oncoming vehicle. When
this is the situation it can be fairly argued that the driver's duty
toward the man in the opposite lane is higher than his duty
toward the owner of the obstructing vehicle, and that his con-
duct should not be so readily excused. In* such case he is being
charged with primary negligence, not merely with contributory
fault; his adversary is an innocent oncomer, rather than a
guilty highway obstructor. This was the type of fact situation
before the court last term in Noland v. Liberty Mutual In8urance
Company.28 The court of appeal had reversed the trial court's
finding that the driver approaching the obstructing vehicle was
negligent, and in so doing the appellate court relied on the line
of cases referred to above involving rear-end collisions between
the operator of the obstructing vehicle and the driver of the car
approaching from the rear.29 The reader's particular attention
is called to the interesting dissent of Judge Tate, in which he
carefully distinguishes the two kinds of accident situations dis-
cussed above, and he observes that the same piece of conduct may
be regarded as negligent in one factual context and as non-negli-
gent in another. 80 Upon appeal of the case to the Supreme Court,
the decision of the trial judge on this issue was reinstated. The
interesting distinction drawn by the dissenting opinion was not
referred to by the court, which observed that the situation did
not fall within any of the exceptions to the "assured clear dis-
tance" rule. One may surmise, however, that the Supreme
Court's findings on the facts may have been influenced by the
same considerations that prompted the dissent in the court of
appeal.
A second controversy involving the same apposition of parties
as in the Noland case came before the Supreme Court shortly
thereafter in Rizley v. Cutrer.81 In this case the obstruction con-
sisted of a dangerous highway condition. The paved portion of
the road suddenly ended without warning, resulting in a depres-
sion which had been caused by the repeated contact of motor
traffic with the shoulder of the unpaved portion of the road.
28. 232 La. 569, 94 So.2d 671 (1957).
29. 89 So.2d 428 (La. App. 1956).
30. Id. at 432.
31. 232 La. 655, 95 So.2d 139 (1957).
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Cutrer, upon suddenly encountering this road condition, lost
control of his car, which swerved into the opposite traffic lane
and collided with an oncoming vehicle in which plaintiffs were
riding. Again, the court of appeal, relying upon the recent ex-
ceptions to the "assured clear distance" rule, found that Cutrer
was not guilty of any negligence. 32 Again, the Supreme Court
reversed and gave judgment for plaintiff. This time the excel-
lent opinion of Justice McCaleb clearly distinguished the duty
of the driver approaching the obstruction in those cases where
suit is against the obstructor from the duty owed by the same
driver to the occupants of an oncoming vehicle in the opposite
lane of traffic. The opinion emphasized that a driver who leaves
his own traffic lane is presumed guilty of negligence. "In other
words, it was his burden to show that he was not guilty of any
dereliction, however slight, which may have had causal connec-
tion with the accident."
This decision affords new evidence of what is becoming an
increasingly prominent theme in traffic cases: Highway obstruc-
tion, however it may be brought about, is dealt with severely
by the courts in civil litigation. If A, by leaving his car unat-
tended on the highway without warning, causes B, who is ap-
proaching from the rear, to collide with the rear end of A's ve-
hicle, A will not be permitted to excuse himself readily by rely-
ing upon B's failure to avoid A's obstruction. However, if B, in
his effort to avoid the obstruction, passes into the opposite lane
of traffic, with a resulting collision, then B, in turn, has become
an obstructor of oncoming traffic, and B's obstruction will not
be dismissed lightly. Of course, if A, the original obstructor, is
made party defendant, the ultimate liability should fall upon him.
The same manifest aversion to highway obstruction probably
accounts in large part for the strict attitude of courts every-
where toward the motorist who becomes involved in an accident
while attempting to make a left-hand turn across the opposite
lane of traffic.
DEFAMATION
In Nagim v. Morrison,88 a suit for libel was instituted against
defendants, Mayor of the City of New Orleans and the former
Superintendent of Police of that city. The alleged cause of action
32. Mershon v. Cutrer, 85 So.2d 639 (La. App. 1956). This case was decided
by the court of appeal prior to the Noland controversy.
33. 232 La. 826, 95 So.2d 326 (1957).
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was based upon the institution of a proceeding before the Louisi-
ana Board of Tax Appeals for the revocation of beer and liquor
permits issued to Nagim. In fact, Nagim had notified the New
Orleans miscellaneous revenue department that he no longer op-
erated the establishment, and a notation to that effect was made
in the record. It was conceded that Nagim's recovery would de-
pend upon his ability to show that statements made by defend-
ants in the revocation proceeding were made maliciously and
without probable cause. The evidence failed to establish this.
Plaintiff had failed to notify the State Department of Revenue
of his retirement from the operation, and the revocation action
was instituted in part in reliance upon the records of that de-
partment.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Wex S. Malone*
PURCHASER'S COMPENSATION LIABILITY TO SELLER'S EMPLOYEES
For many years our courts have maintained the position that
the employee of the person who sells and delivers timber to a
buyer is not entitled to workmen's compensation from the latter
under R.S. 23:1061 (the provision of the statute subjecting a
principal to the compensation claim of his contractor's em-
ployee).' This position has resulted in numerous hardships
among those employed in the lumber industry. There has de-
veloped a fairly common practice by the Louisiana lumber buyer
of interjecting a middleman between himself and the owner of
the standing timber. Ownership of the timber is transferred to
this intermediary who, in turn, agrees to sever it and deliver it
by way of resale to the ultimate purchaser. Usually it is this
ultimate purchaser who initiates the entire transaction. Such
purchases are almost universally made solely on the credit of
the ultimate buyer. Usually such buyer withholds from money
due the intermediary a sum sufficient to pay the owner of the
standing timber, and this sum is paid directly to the latter. In
practical effect, the intermediary is no more than a contractor
who is paid for severing and hauling the timber. Yet, since the:
title passes through him, the courts have felt compelled to ex-
clude him from the classification of contractor, because he is.
regarded as a "seller." Apparently it is assumed that such a
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. MALoNE, LouISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PACTICE I 123
(1951).
